Re-thinking the law on United Nations Peace Enforcement in the context of Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013)
1 Introduction
The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2098(2013) creating and approving the deployment of an Intervention Combat Brigade (ICB) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The deployment of ICB is intended to reinforce the already existing UN Peace keeping forces in the DRC known as MONUSCO by authorizing the UN army to use lethal force, if necessary.
Under the umbrella of the United Nations, forces from Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa will form the ICB and fight along side the national army of the DRC against the various armed groups including M23 which are fighting the DRC government. The M23 rebels are alleged to be financed and militarily supported by the Uganda and Rwanda governments although both states deny the allegations. Both Uganda and Rwanda armed forces have, in the past, invaded the DRC.
The article examines the legal status of the United Nations Military Personnel, who have transitioned from peace keepers to combatants. In the process of peace enforcement, the United Nations soldiers, whether peacekeepers or peacemakers, and other parties, (whether national armies or non-state actors) to the armed conflict are under a duty to comply with international humanitarian law (IHL).
However, the law of armed conflict or IHL remains ambiguous as to whether victims of United Nations peacekeepers (whenever UN solders are alleged to have committed serious crimes), have rights of access before international criminal tribunals or courts to initiate criminal prosecution or seek other remedies including compensation from the United Nations. To address these we commence with brief discussion on the Mandate of UN peacekeepers and whether international tribunals or courts have jurisdiction.
- Mandate of UN Peacekeepers and whether Violators may be prosecuted by International Tribunals or Courts
As forums of judicial response to violations of the Law of War, the mandate of the international criminal tribunals and courts is to prosecute combatants from all sides of the conflicts who violate IHL. Contemporary State practices and jurisprudence of the ICC, so far, suggest that not all members of the armed forces of States who violate IHL are prosecutable before international courts[1] because any of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council may exercise their right of veto to block any request by State Parties or the ICC Chief Prosecutor’s decision to investigate and prosecute alleged violations.
International criminal prosecutions of perpetrators since the establishment of the ICTR and SCSL have generally targeted ‘rebel groups’ or defeated combatants. It is the ICTY that has prosecuted persons who violate IHL regardless of which side of the conflict they were on.
Because of the nature of the armed conflicts in the Federal Republic of Former Yugoslavia, the ICTY was able to prosecute more persons on charges of war crimes than crimes of genocide or crimes against humanity. The ICTR, on the other hand, has prosecuted more persons for the crimes of genocide than war crimes or crimes against humanity. The SCSL has adjudicated two cases, so far, and the ICC, as at the time of writing, none.
Compared to the rich jurisprudence developed by the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL on war crimes, the few numbers of individuals prosecuted do not function to undermine the authority and relevance of the jurisprudence so far developed by the Trial and Appeals Chambers of these Tribunals.
At the ICTR, the focus was, and still is, on prosecuting genocide hence very few prosecutions for war crimes have been conducted. The SCSL has prosecuted members of armed groups or militias including one members of the government, namely, the Deputy Minister of Defence as well as members of the government armed forces. The ICC, at the time of writing, is still at investigation stage and has indicted members of the government (including the President and a sitting cabinet minister in the Sudan government), a militia leader (a Janjaweed militia in Sudan), a former Vice-President (in the DRC) and five rebel commanders, including their leader (the LRA leadership in Uganda). In all these cases, save those before the ICC, victims have limited and fettered rights of access before the tribunals or courts.
During the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the DRC, the United Nations deployed peacekeepers to protect the civilian population including civilian objects. However, in all the four States, the United Nations was not very successful in protecting the civilian population. A number of civilians were killed in Sarajevo although the United Nations peacekeepers were stationed there to protect them. In Rwanda, more than eight hundred thousand civilians were killed when the United Nations peacekeepers where stationed in that country. Similarly, in the DRC, it is estimated that up to four million people have been killed or have died as a result of armed conflict related causes. Whether the United Nations peace keepers were unwilling or unable to protect the civilian population is a moot point. The mandate of the United Nations peacekeepers was to protect the civilian population and they did not successfully execute that mandate. And when the United Nations fail to protect the civilian population, what rights of access to international tribunals or courts do the civilians, as victims, have to initiate criminal prosecutions or seek other remedies including compensation?
3. Legal Status of the UN Military Personnel under the Law of War
The United Nations peacekeeping force has a long history of excellent service under very difficult conditions. Few soldiers who violate IHL should therefore not be permitted to tarnish the good name of the United Nations peacekeepers and the service they provide to some of the most deprived people in the world. As many African States are increasingly seen by the international community as unable or unwilling to protect their own nationals, the United Nations, through its many agencies has, in practice, taken over most of the obligations of governments in African States. It is indeed the failure of African governments to extend reasonable protection to their own nationals that have led the United Nations to adopt the resolution on ‘Responsibility to protect’, spearheaded by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an unprecedented increase in the number of the United Nations’ military personnel, working as peace-keepers or peace-enforcement personnel in Africa. Unfortunately, in implementing their mandates, many allegations of rape, sexual violence, and other violations of the laws and customs of war have been made against some members of the United Nations military personnel.
In the DRC and Sierra Leone, for example, allegations that United Nations military personnel sexually abused young girls, exchanged guns and ammunitions with rebel militias for gold and in some cases when rebels attack the civilians residing at camps for the internally displaced persons, the United Nations military personnel simply abandoned the civilian population at the mercy of the rebels.
The failure to provide protection in particular has resulted in many civilian deaths. In Rwanda, for example, the United Nations military personnel failed to provide adequate protection to Tutsi civilians and moderate Hutus many of whom were killed. In the DRC, while many United Nations military personnel are deployed to protect the civilian population, a number of civilians are killed by the various militia groups and sometimes by DRC government armed forces, suggesting that the United Nations peace keepers are failing to protect the civilian population.
Whenever allegations of IHL is made against the United Nations military personnel, as was the case in the DRC and Sierra Leone, the United Nations responded by conducting its own investigations and did conclude that some individual members of the United Nations military personnel did violate the law. However, not a single member of United Nations military personnel has been prosecuted by an international criminal tribunal or court for these violations.
On the contrary, the individuals identified as perpetrators were allowed to return to their respective countries and there is no evidence that upon return, these individuals were prosecuted for the crimes they had committed while on United Nations mission by their respective national courts. The exception is France which prosecuted one of its soldiers who sexually abused young girls while on duty in the DRC as a member of the United Nations peacekeeper.
3.1 Current State Practice and the Law of the UN Charter
The current State practice suggests that the United Nations military personnel are treated differently from their colleagues in the national armies of the member States of the United Nations who work for their States and not for the United Nations. Soldiers in the national armies are often prosecuted for acts or omissions resulting in a violation of the Law of War through their respective military tribunals or court marshals. Further, senior military officers are prosecuted for failing to prevent, or if the crime is already committed, for failing to punish their subordinates for violations of the Law of War. The issue to ponder is why the United Nations military personnel are not subjected to the same laws that other combatants who commit war crimes at the national level are prosecuted for by military tribunals or courts?
In examining the law on possible individual criminal responsibility of the United Nations military personnel for violations of the Law of War, the central issue is whether the Law of War, namely, The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its Additional Protocol I and II of 1977 including customary international law regulate the conduct of the United Nations military personnel who are deployed on peace keeping or peace enforcement missions.
What then is the applicable law that regulate the conduct of the United Nations military personnel? The starting point is that the legal status of the United Nations military personnel is not determined solely by the law of the Charter of the United Nations but by reference to their rights and obligations under the applicable law, and to the terms of service. Civil and criminal jurisdictions that apply to the United Nations Military Personnel are determined on a case-by-case basis.[2]
The law which regulates the conduct of the United Nations military personnel when assigned on missions on the basis of the Security Council Resolution may be classified in four broad categories. The first category that regulates the conduct of the United Nations peacekeeper while on mission is the national law of the host or receiving State. When on a United Nations mission, the peace keepers have obligation to respect and comply with the laws of the host State. This includes ordinary laws of the host State, for example, the law of contract, marriage, land, traffic, etc. Significantly however, the United Nations peace keepers must also comply with the military law of the host State that may impact on their work.
The second category of the law applicable to the United Nations peacekeepers is the United Nations law, based on its Charter provisions and subsequent legal opinion provided by its subsidiary organ, the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The United Nations law is classified into general law which are applicable in all authorized United Nations operations on the one hand, and a specific law regulating the conduct of the United Nations soldiers in the particular operations or categories of operations. This special law specifically stipulate the rules of engagement for the operation in question.
As regards the specific law in respect of a United Nations peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation, the United Nations has provided some guidelines on how to deal with soldiers operating under its umbrella when they violate IHL. The 1994 United Nations Convention on the Safety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel[3] and the 1990 United Nations Model Status-of-forces Agreement for peacekeeping operations[4] are two examples. As far as the specific law is concerned, rules and guidelines adopted per operation in the United Nations context concern the mandate and terms of reference, including rules of engagement.
The third category of the law that regulate the conduct of the United Nations peacekeepers is that of the contributing or participating State (i.e. troop-contributing nation). States that contribute soldiers for the United Nations often desire that their troops face justice in their own jurisdiction, that being the law they are most conversant and comfortable with. At the practical level, the troop contributing States often need approval from their respective national parliaments. The participating States are as well responsible for the equipment and other support material their soldiers need to effectively take part on the United Nations mission.
To that extent, it is not surprising that States sending their troops on United Nations peace keeping missions often attach conditions to it. One such condition is that the national law of the troop contributing country shall be the law applicable in event of a violation of IHL by any member of the contributing State. This is the rationale for sending the United Nations peace keepers who violate the Law of War to face investigation and prosecution before their own domestic or municipal law courts in their respective States.
The fourth category of the law which govern the United Nations military operations are the applicable rules of general IHL law.[5] This includes The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its Additional Protocol I and II of 1977.
The application of this fourth category of the law is contested by the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (UNOLA). However, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNOLA have taken different positions on the application of IHL to members of the United Nations peacekeeping force.
- Comparing and contrasting UN and ICRC Legal Positions
The practice of the United Nations is that when a United Nations soldier violates IHL while on a United Nations mission, the alleged perpetrator is returned to his country of origin or citizenship and the case against him or her is conducted in accordance with his or her national law, customary international law or military law but not the law of the Charter of the United Nation or that of the host or receiving state.
In determining whether the United Nations military personnel on a peace-keeping or peace enforcement mission failed to protect the civilian population, the starting point is to look at the mandate of that mission as authorised by the Security Council, and whether it is a Chapter VI or Chapter VII authorization under the Charter of the United Nations.
The mandates of the United Nations military personnel differ by operation, and are outlined by the United Nations Security Council enabling resolution or in a report by the Secretary General approved by the Security Council. A relevant question in this context is whether the mandate assigns any explicit tasks to the force and its members with regard to protecting civilians, the civilian population, civilian objects or enforcing general compliance with IHL by the parties concerned. Where the mandate of the mission is vague with respect to the protection of the civilian population, and the Security Council resolution authorizing the mission is open to more than one reasonable or logical interpretation, what rights do victims have in event of the mission’s failure to implement the mandate in protecting them?
The mandate often defines the tasks, and terms of reference. The term of reference goes further and describes the means by which these tasks should be accomplished. The United Nations military personnel are often required by their mandates to only use force in self-defence and must act with complete impartiality. The mandate must define clearly what level of use of force is allowed. The directive is crucial if the force and its members are tasked to implement the protection of human rights or the protection of the civilian population in situation of on-going armed conflicts. The usual formula is: The United Nations Force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character. It will not use force except in self-defence.
The principle of self-defence is, however, usually broadened to specify that: “Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the Force from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council.”[6] The United Nations mandates drafted in the above terms have generally failed to extend protection to the civilian population as fully documented by Gen. Romeo Dallaire, the United Nations Force Commander in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide.[7]
The rules of engagement for a United Nations military force elaborate on the means that it may use and translate them into military operational terms. The scope of the rules of engagement for a United Nations military force is, as far as fundamental points are concerned, aimed at preserving non-coerciveness: negotiations first, then if, necessary, the application of unarmed force and, only after that, armed force, but as little as possible. The United Nations military force may never take the initiative for the use of force. The general operational rule requires that action should always be a reaction and never a preventive action.[8]
The scope of application of IHL to United Nations military personnel is, to that extent, unambiguous. There are two schools of thought concerning the applicability of IHL to United Nations peacekeeping operations. The first school of though is that articulated by the United Nations legal experts at the Office of Legal Affairs (UNOLA). The second is the view of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The initial position of UNOLA was an extreme view, a position, as discussed below, was opposed by the ICRC.[9]
3.2.1 The UN Legal Position
The UNOLA argues that the United Nations is not bound by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II of 1977, or by IHL (that is The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907) because the United Nations is not a party to The Hague and the four Geneva Conventions including Additional Protocols I and II of 1977, and may never be.
The UNOLA argument is grounded on the premise that only sovereign States, and not international organisations, as for example, the United Nations, that in law has the legal capacity to ratify international conventions. UNOLA submits that, as an international organisation, the United Nations is unsuited for carrying out most of the obligations in The Hague and the Geneva Conventions because the United Nations lacks the administrative organs with which sovereign States are endowed.[10] UNOLA further argues that if the United Nations were bound by the contents of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 as part of customary international law, it would still remain outside the scope of their application on the ground that the United Nations is not a “Power” or “High Contracting Party” in the sense used in the Geneva Conventions. To that extent, UNOLA argues that the United Nations would not as well be bound by the Law of War in general.[11]
According to the position taken by the United Nations, its soldiers may be involved in armed conflict, but shall never be a party to it as combatants. The premise of the submission is that the United Nations cannot be at war, but may find itself in a war-like situation with the sole purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security. Therefore, it is argued, soldiers serving in the United Nations operations can never be classified as combatants.[12]
The United Nations concedes that it is bound only by the principles and spirit of IHL treaties. However, the United Nations never conceded that forces serving in any United Nations operations were under legal obligation to comply with the entire body of IHL. The United Nations approach is minimalist. The underlying reason for this position is that the United Nations wants to avoid the impression that it is taking sides in a conflict, and the formal acceptance of the Law of War could imply that the United Nations is abandoning its impartial position or its neutrality[13] and becoming a party taking active part in hostilities and therefore a combatant.
The position adopted by the United Nations is a legal fiction. The unintended consequence of the position adopted by the United Nations is to undermine the core principles of the Law of War and to further deny itself the opportunity to take the moral high ground on insisting that all member States of the United Nations, including non-state actors like Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, Tamil Tigers, Lords Resistance Army, etc, must comply with the Law of War including customary international law in the conduct of armed conflicts whether international or non-international in character. All the non-State actors are not a “Power” or a “High Contracting Party” within the meaning of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its Additional Protocol I and II of 1977 and yet they are expected to comply with the Law of War. The United Nations argument lacks coherence and is not supported by State practice which demand of non-State actors’ compliance with the Law of War.
Further, even if the United Nations is not a “Power” or a “High Contracting Party” and lacks administrative organs with which States are endowed, it is inconceivable that the United Nations would demand of non-State actors, as for example, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah or Hamas compliance with international law and exempt itself from similar compliance with the Law of War.
3.2.2 The ICRC Legal Position
In contrast to the United Nations position, the ICRC has argued persuasively that IHL is applicable to all United Nations peacekeeping operations. The ICRC advances two grounds in support of its submission. First, the ICRC argues that the object and purpose of humanitarian law is to contain the inherent suffering brought about by armed conflict to the greatest extent possible and therefore provide protection to the greatest number of the civilian population.
Viewed in the ICRC’s context, it makes no difference as to who is holding the gun, whether a United Nations soldier or an armed guerrilla associated with a non-State actor and for what reasons the gun is used to cause harm to a civilian. Every person involved in an armed conflict will have to abide by the rules of IHL, even those fighting in the name of the United Nations.[14]
Second, it is recognized that the United Nations forces on the ground often loose its impartiality during a given operation. The United Nations Force may do so by gradually siding with one of the parties to the armed conflict. It is also possible that the United Nations may continue to be impartial but one or all parties to the armed conflict may have the perception that the United Nations is no longer neutral and is siding with the other party. In either situation the United Nations will become involved in the armed conflict as if it were a party, thereby turning its soldiers into combatants, to whom the rules of IHL apply. In a legal sense, the United Nations is subject to customary international humanitarian law, even if not bound by the relevant treaties, to the extent that it engages in armed conflicts, whether international or non-international in character.
The position of the ICRC is that all provisions of IHL are applicable when United Nations contingents resort to force. In practice, the ICRC has called on all combatants, including the United Nations soldiers, to ensure that parties to armed conflicts respect and comply with IHL at all times.
In November 1961, for example, the ICRC sent a general memorandum to the governments of all State Parties to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to members of the United Nations, concerning the application of those Conventions to armed forces of States on United Nations missions. The ICRC memorandum states, inter alia, that in view of the fact that the United Nations as such is not a party to the Conventions, each troop-contributing country is responsible for their application.[15] It would be desirable, therefore, if national contingents received instructions before their departure from their respective countries that would enable them to comply with the Conventions, in the event of their having to use force. The ICRC reminded States that under Common Article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, parties were obliged not only to respect the Conventions, but also to ensure respect for them. The ICRC expressed the hope that contributing States would exercise their influence to ensure that provisions of IHL were applied by all contingents and by the United Nations command.[16]
3.3.3 Current UN Legal Position
On 6 August 1999, the United Nations Secretary-General promulgated fundamental principles and rules of IHL applicable to forces under United Nations command and control in situation of armed conflict,[17] and entered into force on 12 August, 1999. The Secretary-General’s directive was, in effect, an executive order to all United Nations Member States. The Secretary-General’s directive are applicable to all United Nations forces whether in support operations or enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations but does not exhaust the field of IHL, and do not prejudice the application thereof, nor do they replace pertinent national laws.
Two points must be emphasised in the Secretary-General’s directive. First, the United Nations undertakes to ensure that its military personnel on missions shall conduct their operations with full respect for the principles and rules of general application to the conduct of military operations. The United Nations also undertakes to ensure that military personnel are fully acquainted with the principles and rules of those international instruments; the obligation to respect the said principles and the rules is applicable to United Nations forces even in the status-of-forces agreement. Second, in cases of IHL violations, members of the United Nations forces are subject to prosecution in their national courts. Attacks on civilians or civilian objects are proscribed, and United Nations forces are required to take feasible precautions to protect civilians from dangers resulting from military operations. The United Nations forces are prohibited from engaging in operations of a nature likely to cause unjustified casualties among civilians or damage to civilian property.
The effect of the Secretary-General’s directive are twofold: first, it is a legally binding text for any future United Nations-commanded operations and secondly, it evokes “fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law” whereas in the past the United Nations had declared its adherence only to “principles and spirit” of international humanitarian law.
The layers of laws that purport to regulate the conduct of the United Nations forces, namely, the law of the troop-contributing States; the law of the receiving or host State and whether or not The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I and II of 1977 do not apply (the United Nations position) or applies (the ICRC position) raise complex legal issues in relation to identification and application of the IHL and the extent to which the civilian population are protected.
Attempts by the United Nations to reject the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II of 1977, and instead limit the law applicable to the United Nations forces and re-classify the law as “principles and spirit” of IHL or as later clarified by the Secretary-General’s directive “fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law” is both inadequate and unfortunate.
It is inadequate because the United Nations reluctance to expressly and in unambiguous manner accept that the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I and II of 1977 apply to the United Nations soldiers function to undermine respect for, and compliance with, the Law of War. As there are increasing numbers of non-State actors in each successive international or non-international armed conflict, or in “the war on terror”, the United Nations is expected to be a role model to “rouge States” and non-State actors in encouraging respect for international law and not to adopt a minimalist approach to the applicability of IHL.
The position adopted by the United Nations is unfortunate because it has tended to reflect positions adopted by some influential members of the United Nations who in recent and contemporary armed conflicts have ignored the Law of War in the conduct of armed conflicts. It is as well significant that some influential members of the United Nations have not ratified the ICC Statute and, to that extent, demonstrating disdain for IHL in particular, and international criminal justice system in general. It is important that the United Nations takes the moral high ground by adopting the entire legal regime that regulates the conduct of armed conflicts whether international or non-international in character.
- Conclusion
It is true that, from the mid-1980s to the time of writing, the United Nations has played and continues to play active roles, not only in peace keeping and peace-enforcement operations, but in adopting new laws or amending old ones for the regulation of armed conflicts. The active roles played by other organisations with close links to the United Nations also assisted in formulating rules and regulations for the protection of victims of armed conflicts. Of particular importance is the role played by the ICRC in the adoption of Common Article 3 and Geneva Convention IV of 1949 (the Civilians Conventions), a convention which has been described as “truly a legal charter of fundamental and detailed human rights in armed conflicts.”[18]
On the other hand, the Security Council has often opted not to use its great clout to adopt resolutions that protect the lives of civilians whenever it authorises use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The unwillingness of the United Nations to protect civilians in times of war is, unfortunately, consistent with the roles the Major Powers played at the adoption of The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
The failure of the United Nations soldiers to protect civilians during the Rwanda genocide will always remain a blot on otherwise an excellent history of the United Nations. The Rwanda civilian population were led to believe that the United Nations soldiers would protect them. The United Nations soldiers failed to do so. The lowest point for the United Nations soldiers was when at ETO, a place just outside Kigali in Rwanda, where the United Nations soldiers were stationed to protect Tutsi civilians and moderate Hutus at a time when the Interahamwe had surrounded the school, waiting to kill the Tutsis as soon as the United Nations soldiers left. The United Nations soldiers collected all foreign nationals and evacuated them; leaving Rwandans at ETO to be slaughtered, and indeed many Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed by the Interhamwe soon after the United Nations soldiers left.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the United Nations should take urgent measures to adopt comprehensive laws, rules and regulations for the conduct of the UN Peacekeeping force and to strengthen provisions for the protection of the civilian population in times of armed conflicts or political insurrections or disturbances.
FOOT NOTES:
[1] While the ICC has focused on indicting persons from the rebel groups or non-State actors (the leadership of the Lords Resistance Army in Uganda and the Congolese rebel leader, Mr. Lubanga) and defeated parties to the armed conflict (former Vice- President of the DRC Mr. Bemba), the ICC has submitted an indictment to the Trial Chamber for approval seeking confirmation and a warrant of arrest to be issued for the arrest of a sitting President of a member State of the United Nations, Mr. Bashir of Sudan. This is a positive move and is welcome.
[2] See, Siekmann, R.C.R, “The legal responsibility of military personnel” in Ku, C, and Jacobson, H.K, (eds.), Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003), at pp.104-123.
[3] Reprinted in (1995) 34 ILM 482; see also Siekmann, R.C.R. “The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel: Its Scope of Application” in Denters, E, and Schrijver, N, (eds.), Reflections on International Law from the Low Countries – In Honour of Paul de Waart (The Hague, Boston, and London, Kluwer Law International, 1998), at pp.315-23.
[4] UN Doc.A/45/594. This document, which is not a treaty in force, is based on established practice and draws extensively upon earlier a current practice of the UN peace-keeping operations. The model is intended to serve as a basis for the drafting of individual agreements to be concluded between the UN and the States on whose territory peacekeeping operations are deployed. Of a similar nature is the UN model agreement regulating the relations between the UN and the troop-contributing States (see UN Doc.A/46/185). It confirms that participating States, their national contingents, and its members are bound by the relevant provisions of the Model Status-of-forces Agreement for peacekeeping operations. The most important provision of the 1990 Model Status-of-forces Agreement is Article 6 which provides that Peacekeepers shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating States in respect of any criminal offences which may be committed by them in the host country or territory.
[5] See, Siekmann, R.C.R, “The legal responsibility of military personnel”, supra, note 2, at p.105.
[6] Siekmann, R.C.R, “Peace-Keeping in the Middle East: Establishing the Concept” in .Kellerman, A.E, Siehr, K and Einhorn, T, (eds.), Israel among the Nations- International and Comparative Law Perspectives on Israel 50th Anniversary (The Hague, Boston, and London, Kluwer Law International, 1998), at pp.367-80.
[7] Gen. Dallaire, R, Shake Hands With The Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Random House (Canada, 2003).
[8] Paphiti, A.S, “Rules of Engagement within Multinational Land Operations” (1996) Military Law Review, at pp.1-12.
[9] Greenwood, C, “International Humanitarian Law and the United Nations Military Operations” in Fischer, H, (ed.), Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Institute, 1998), vol. I, at pp.3-34.
[10] See, Siekmann, R.C.R, “The legal responsibility of military personnel”, supra, note 342, at p.109.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id, at p.110.
[14] Id, at pp.110-111.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13: Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law.
[18] Draper, G.I.A.D, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 in The Hague Academy series Recueil des Cours, 1965(I), 61ff.
